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IN TilE SUPRI:llE COUl":T
Of' THf: STi\TE OF U'i'i\H

STATE OF UTAH, in the
int~rest of Evan Orgill
an(; Bart Orgill, persons
under eighteen years of
age.

Case No. 15140

JOYCE THOMASON,
Appellant.

BRIEF ON APPEAL OF
RESPONDENT, STATE OF
UTAH
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case in which the Utah State Division of
Family Services petitioned the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake
County to permanently deprive the natural parents of Evan
and Bart Orgill of all rights to said children pursuant
to the provisions of Section 78-3a-48 (formerly known as
Section 55-10-109) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE JUVENILE COURT
The Juvenile Court, the Honorable John Farr Larson
presiding, after trial before said Court, granted the
Petition and on March 22, 1977, entered its Order terminating
all rights, including residual rights, of Leonard Orgill,
father, and Joyce Thomason, mother, in and to said children.
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Th'c

r~·sponc:2nt

State of Utah asks thal lh0

c1i

.l_·;

of the ,Juvenile Cou-cL be affirm<"u.
STi\TEilENT OF PACTS
The respondent State of Utah does not feel that
appellant has made a complete and adequate Statement of
Facts, and for this reason accepts and adopts the state
of facts set forth by co-respondents.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED
TO SUPPORT TERMINATION OF APPELL.l\NT'S
PARENTAL RIGHTS BY REASON OF ABANDONMENT.
Appellant contends that the evidence was insuffick I
suppcrt an abandonment of the two children Evan and Bart,
on the grounds:
1.

Placing of the children with the Divvision of r;j

Services was prompted by the appellant's concern, not he·
disregard, for the children,

2.

(Appellant's Brief, pg. 5),

There is nothing in the evidence to prove t~t

appellant did not attempt to see the children when in 5'·'
Lake City between June, 1974, and the present,

3.

The Division repeatedly frustrated appellants

efforts to see the children,
4.

(Ibid. :

(Ibid. pg. 6)

The Divi:c -:in failed to take steps to reunite

appella '· with the children,

(Ibid. pg. 6), and
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:.1

':i.

There wilo nothi,1g in the evidence cc;tiJ.blisnirl<J

that app2llant had r·
nor w0s she

legall~

ability to s·12port the: children,

ordered to do so.

(Ibid. pg. 7)
It may well be

that appellants initial motivati'.in in voluntarily placing
the children with the Division was her concern for them.
Initial motivation is not the determinative factor in a
finding of abandonment.

The Utah statute regarding

abandonment says nothing of motive.

Abandonment is a

question of fact determined as follows:
"It shall be primia facie evidence of
abandonment that the parent or parents,
although having legal custody of the
child, have surrendered physical custody
of the child, and for a period of six
months following such surrender have not
manifested to the child or to the person
having physical custody of the child a
firm intention to resume physical custody
or make arrangements for the care of the
child." (Section 78-3a-48(b) UCA 1953)
The children were surrendered to the Division for
placement in a foster home in February, 1974.
been in the foster home ever since.

They have

The issue under

consideration is whether appellant has manifested a
"firm intention to resume physical custody or to make
arrangements for the care of the .

[children] . "

A "firm intention" obviously contemplates something more

than perfunctory statements and broken promises.

The

fact is that appellant has visited with the children only
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(R.

63)

I

cl.lid

sorw~l2-!L·2S

in June,

lS'"/1,

1974, uPLJ•.:llant rno·.·cu tu Denver

(JC

Jr,·,).

(R. lGO) witi:Ot'.l cu,;,.

any future arrang<:;;:1ents or plans for the childrPr,. ID.
174).

On Septer.iber 17, 1974, appellant finally

the children.
(R.

(R.

266-267) .

160-161, 170).

wrol~

'·

She has not writ ten sine:

She has provided no support for

tr.~

children, ev2n though she has had regular employment si:.:
October, 1974, nor has she even sent them a present
remembrance since December 1974.
even sent them a birthday card.

(R. 169
(R.

As to insufficiency Claim No.

) .

01

She has nc

169).

2:

It would be diff1:

for respondents to carry the burden of proving thJ.t aF;;c:.•
did not attempt to visit the children during her visits:
Salt Lake City.

The respondents cannot be under an obl1 I

to prove a negative.

Of her 7 or 8 visits to Salt La'.- ·

between July, 1974, and February, 1976, there is affirr.a:.
evidence of only two attempts by her to try and see,
even ask to see, the children.

(R.

~

86,90).

As to insufficiency Claim No. 3:

In December, 19",

after six months of silence in regard the children,
came to Salt Lake and while here asked to see the chil
The social worker felt that a visit would be inadvis:iblc
unless appellant had definite plans for taking and ca
for the children.

(R.

86).

-4-

Appellant later ack 1 10 1·:k"
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,1!1d

acF'-'-'c1

thdt it \'!ilS best s::" not sc2 the childrc:n at

tlut time. (R. 88).

On July 28, 1975, appellant, while

dl)uin in Salt L:t ·c City, asked to see the children.
cume unrtnnouncecl and the children were on vacation.
visit

She
A

was not denied by the Division, but was impossible

to arrange.

(R. 90).

There is no evidence that appellant,

aside from these two occasions, has ever asked to see or
attempted to see her children.

If she had done so, surely

she could have cited specific instances during the trial.
The record certainly doesn't "reek" (Appellant's Brief,
Pg. 6) with frustrations of appellant's efforts to be
reunited with or resume physical custody of the children.
As to insufficiency Claim No. 4:

The fact is that

the Division did take steps, and went as far as it could
as a practical matter, in attempting to reunite appellant
with the children.

In her letter of September 6, 1974,

social worker Christine Colver advised appellant to contact
the Division in order to establish a plan for the return
of the children.

(R. 243).

Appellant made no such contact.

On November 18, 1974, a Division worker again wrote to
appellant suggesting steps she should take and decisions
she should make in order to get her children back (R. 254).

In December, 1974, the social worker attempted to work
out a plan with appellant to enable return of the children
lo her, but obtained no corrunittment or cooperation from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appelL:i11t.
a

socl~l

8G).

(!'.

workur

in th•_: children.

in~uircd

(H. 'H,

again as to appellant's int•
270).

The Di,rision was certJ,

willing to work out a pro'Jro.m to o.ssist appellant

1-1i :-1,

the children - but aprk•llant evidenced little intcre:;'

t

resume care and responsibility for the children until s ..
was actually

faced with their permanent loss, over Lo

years after she had voluntarily placed them with the Div: 1
In the case of State of Utah,
et al.,

In the Interest

r:_f~'-l

514 P.2d 797(1973), likewise an abandonment

the natural mother made a

ca~e.

similar argument; to-wit, that

the Division had failed to take affirmative action to
reuni tc her with her

children.

The Mario A. case was oc

its facts almost identical to the instant case,

involvin~

a mother who placed three small children in the custody c
the Division and then for two and one-half years show~
very little interest in them.

(514 P.2d at pg. 799).

M

in the instant case the Division caseworker had pre~ri~
certain conditions to be followed by the mother in order
to regain custody of the children.

( 514 P. 2d at pg. 798

As in the instant case the mother failed to conform.
failed to visit the children, phone them, or inquire b_
phone as to their welfare,

all as in the instant case.

then complained that the Division workers should ha~
sought her out and initiated visits between her uncl t!l''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1
·

child r,'
Lh<..:'

1 •

(

S 14 P. 2 :i al: P:J .

t_crr; inat io-,1 order,

7 9 9) .

stzi r~c~'.l:

"\Ve do not think the casework2rs are
obligated to go to the extremes which
ap~ellant claims they should have done
in order to kind~ ' and increase a small
flame of desire to be reunited with her
children. \·le think if she was to escape
the provision of the statute regarding
evidence of abandonment, the duty was upon
her to manifest an intere~t within the
six month period after loss of custody.
In this case she failed to manifest a firm
intention to resume physical custody of
her children for over two years." (514
P.2d at pg. 799).
It is therefore the duty of the natural parent to
manifest her interest in the children and to establish
a record in that regard when faced with their loss.

In

the instant case there were successive long periods of
time; from June, 1974, to December, 1974, from December,
1974, to July 1975, from July 1975, to February, 1976, in
which appellant made no attempt to contact the children,
made no inquiry as to their welfare, and manifest no firm
intent to resume custody or responsibility for the children.
It would be error to fault the State for her lack of
interest and establishment of firm intent.
As to insufficiency Claim No. 5:

Contrary to appellant's

Brief (pg. 7), there was evidence as to appellant's ability
to support the abandoned children.

She has had continuous

employment from September, 1974, as a nurses aid (R. 168),

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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month.

( n.

236).

whether or not the Juvenile Court ever did or <lid
aJJpelL:mt to contribute to the S'1pport of her

na~

childr~!',

whether the Juvenile Court m.1:::e a finding that appell i:.:
was unable to do so.

In any event when children are

voluntarily placed with the Division of Family Services i'.
is for the Di vision to determine whether the parent
pay a fee for foster care,
not the Juvenile Court.

v; 1 L

(Section 55-15b-13 UCA 1953),

If a stone has been cast at

appellar:c by the Juvenile court Judge, in his finding, for
her failure to make any contribution whatsoever to the
support of the children, we think it was well thrown
and said failure is certainly evidentiary as to her "fi:::
intention" to make arrangements for the care of the chic·
Without equivocation our legislature has stated that "["',
woman shall support her child;

(Section 78-45-4

UCA 1953)

Conclusion regarding Point I:

This court has ado;·.,

an objective test in determining whether or not a parer:
has abandoned his child in an involuntary termj nation f'.

1

I

ceeding under Section 78-3a-48(b) (Supra); to-wit, has! '
parents' conduct ".

demonstrated a conscious dis""·

of the obligations owed by a parent to a child, kc:i:.
the destruction of the parent-child relationship · ·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and In_ Re B . .::f:_• Alaska, 530 P.2d 747(1975) .)
The CdSe of D.M. v. State (Supra.) is of particular
interest as it seems to parallel our instant case.

In

that case it was held:
[l] We hold that the evidence supports
the conclusion of the trial court that the
mother's parental rights should be terminated by reason of abandonment. Her failur.e
to communicate with or to visit D.M. sine
1965, h?r failure to support the child in
any way ~ither emotionally or fi~~~cially,
together with the lo:'q term comrnitf'.1<ent 0£
D.M. to J fost~er home convinces ',c: that the~
child h~s bee~ abandoned. We take into
·
~idc~ation as-wefi--:u;:e finding of the trial
~-:_that it wa·-; in D~M. 's own interest that
~.'_ant's parental rights be severed.
That
finding is strongly supported by the reports
of 01-. Boyd, a qualified psychiatrist, who
made psychological evaluations of the appellant,
D.M., and D.M. 's foster parents. (515 P.2d at
pg. 1236) (Emphasis added).
In the instant case (with the exception of one letter)
appellant has not communicated with her children and her
last visit took place in June, 1974.

As in D.M. v. State,

this appellant has also failed to provide her children
with either emotional or financial support. (R. 168, 169).
Further, both cases involve long-term foster-home care,
and are supported by psychological studies. (R. 222-235;
239-242;

244-252).

-9-
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[2]

Wh0thc

t: n"t thcl'."n has h:·cn

<'Ill

mJ~Ur:~• ~~.:E·>,~:~~>,'f~:1 ·

focus. ·

Si.ib]ee .ve1nLc.>nt

-~;:anr:L.:icdoTI- n
mu, ·~--:- 1 ::te!\B.On--~-t:1c-:: I).J.J:;-- t'~·i~~-,
fuf1:Fi·..-.:~.T'.. s a·td h::i;!~s- C:oi:: · thco clnldi!P'
to~':J

too li -c :.le' on U1e r.lore ·in~;:iortdr![~ elem~,; of ho·,, w2il the par-:,nts h;1ve di_:;c:1drge~ 1
th•• ir pare.ital responsibility.
·--D.M. v. StQte, supra, 515 at page 1236.
(Emphasis added)
•

In the instant case, appellant has been short on we--

'

as well as actions.

.. I

As sununarized by the Juvenile Court i

in its "Findings of Fact,"

(R.

215)

"B .
. the only positive steps taken by
the mother to affect return of these childr~
has been phone calls and letters to the Divisi:
of Family Services, a request for a home stud/
in Colorado, and the leasing of a three bedroc·
home.
C.
The mother has not supported these chillre:
al though she has had regular employment since
October, 1974.

D.
The mother has not provided emotional
support for said children.
She has not sent
Christmas gifts (except Christmas, 1974) or
birthday cards; the mother wrote one letter
to the children."
The test

[for abandonment]

focuses on two gues~i~;·

has the parent's conduct evidenced a disregard for his
parental obligation, and has that disregard led to t~
destruction of the parent-child relationship?"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

l

(1975).

In adc:i.tio11 to

di srv,ilrding hccr pare11tal obligations by fai Lure to maint-1

t_ 11

contact with her chil::::en, appellant admiL; thut t:\.!(·e ::.:;
no·:1 no meaningful relationship between her and the children.

(R. 167).

And

f~rther,

the psychological reports and

testimony based thereon strongly indicate that both boys
would suffer trauma if taken from their foster home where
they have established a deep emotional commitment and
psychological parent-child relationship (R. 26-31, 40-44,
60, 248, 251.).

It appears obvious that appellant has

consciously disregarded her obligations to her children.
Such disregard constitutes an abandonment.
POINT II
APPELLANT IS UNFIT OR INCOMPETENT BY
REASON OF CONDUCT OR CONDITIONS SERIOUSLY
DETRIMENTAL TO HER CHILDREN.
Appellant acknowledges that ".

the court must be

convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct or condition [of the parent(s)] is seriously detrimental
in its effect on the child .

.

.

" (Appellant's Brief p. 8).

She has not, however, challenged the validity or accuracy
of the rather thorough psychological studies and reports
and other evidence supporting the Juvenile Court's decision.
Dr. Gordon B. Wilson, consulting clinical psychologist,
who evaluated appellant on lJovernber 27, 1976, concluded:

-11-
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eqc.i'?.J='
C0:1tLOl

ar:d

it

-~l•:J

•.:.·,~1lu

f:< the:r
1

:. 1~

(Jf'

v"'' ·'

,~_!J• )lt_~,,r•c:nl

Cll

1

l'~j t

I

di ffi• ·lt fo· 11:»
tiorc,:il p::ol i2r;s Lli yo'"~.r;·_..

to CO[J·e '.:1.t'1 c-;·10
aged chllci'.';;1. (IL p. 227)
. Sl1c• ';·.·u
to be a cerson 1·1ho will sinccrclv attc:::•ut
to Jo heL· bc.3t to cop2 1·1iti1 whd~··cvcr cl;',_
cul+-.ics arise, but a person who l1as gr
limitations in coping skills." (I<. p. 22L)
Dr. II. Mcix Cutler, clinical psychologist, concluc1cci:
" It is my consid-2red opi:-iion th;•t the:;co
boys ought to be ad~)ted by the Roscrs
(foster parents) since their natu·cal pan·;1ts
apparently either are not interested in th.cn1
or are not able to t:ake care of tt·1c.-.1 anc.i tb~"
bothba.:ily need str'..lcture- to coun'::.-:rmz111d t~ .. ·
obvious emotional problems apparent in both
boys' protocals." (R. p. 252)(Ernphasisadded)
The evidence pertaining to appellant's unfitness and ir.competency appears to be uncontroverted.
is in fact insufficient, appellant should state how or"'
Unless shown to be clearly against the weight of the e•:
the decision of the court below must stand.
According to appellant,

"In the instant case, no sr.:

is made in the evidence that there is any causal_

.j

~

between any detrimental effect on Evan and Bart by cor.::::
or condition of the appellant."

(Appellant's Brief P·

s,.

Respondent would merely point out the inconsistant re 1·-'·
which could arise from a requirement of "causal cor:nec'.:
Assuming no adverse effects prior to abandonment, it i.: ..
defy all reason to require a court to return childrrn:
an environment which would most certainly be detri~··
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I

\'Jils::m 's report clearly demcms'-.rzitc the= in

IJ_,-.

irl~qu:Jr:

and incurn1>-'"tence of both the u.ppellant and her husb-ind Ke·
(R. 272-235).
of

Ev~n

Further, his ''Psychological

Evaluatio~"

ces
.:o~:h.

report

and Dzirt Orgill indicates the existence of adverse

effects prior to separation from the natural parents:
"It is evident that this
[Evan] is
extremely frightened that his structure is
going to be destroyed again.
He was old
enough when he was taken from his parents,
and while he was with his natural parents,
to be tr2r.1matized by their behavior. * * *
He is terrified to get too close to people
because that's the way to get hurt, to be
rejected as he was by his natural parents
and reportedly especially by his mother."
(R. 248)

That the boys are better off where they are now is also
reflec~ed

by the report:
"[Bart) very much wants to stay right where
he is and feels that the foster parents are
his real parents"
(R. 231).

* * *

"Both boys reflect the consideration and
love of the Rosers and it seems to me they
ought to be a permanent family." (R. 252).
As stated in the case of .!_n

Re~,

supra,

in recent

years the courts have become increasingly aware of the
rights of the children."

Respondent submits that appellant's

disregard of her parental obligations has led to the destruction
of the parent-child relationship and that the best interests
of the children dictate a legal severance of that relationship.

-13-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•'slab:!
(R.

l'i)

.~t:!d

bc!lh'L'''"

In fact,

Llir~

child i.lart ond the f.•stc·,- U

h,) thinLo. his naL.ural parL''1ls clr"

and has no image of them wh;:itsoever.

(H.

11).

c!

'l'hi" Coe:_

is no doubt aware of the peo·dagogiccil debate going

o~

ic

social work circles and family law courts across thi·;
land as to the n.1tural parent pr2sumption vs. th::
logical parent presumption.

ps;·~'·-

(See Drs. Goldstein, Fre•JJ

Solnit, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child)

~:

The inst:

case seems a classic example of where the best interest
of the child dictates that custody should remain with t'."
psychological parents.

In the case of Ross v. Hoffman,

Md. Ct. Spec App, 1976, 264 A.2d 596, it was held that
"mothering" is a function and not just a biological fac• i
and that finding by the trial court that the interest c'
the child is best served by reraaining with the "psyc~tparent" was not in error.

In that case the Maryland

co~:

also held that a long period of separation between natu:.
parent and child served to rebut the presumptive prefe:;·
for the natural parent, and that although the period o'.
separation did not of itself require custody he deni 2 ~:
natural parent, i t CJ.t least put both parent and surro~:on an even keel.

The Court al so suggested that acld1ti:·

preference should be given to th2 surrog;:ite when tile: was voluntarily surrendered as opposed to a court-ct
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Cl. f:_

ch.~ld's

t :_"l 1:i ~ ~

lo

futu•_-.-,_

Cerldinly all thc:>s:-c considerations which imprcss2cl the
M<lryland Court in denying the custody petition of the
natural parent arc present in our instant case.
In the

cas~

of In re John F., Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas,

1976, 3 FLR 2160, it was held that in a termination
of parental rights proceeding involving three children
placed in foster care, the biological fact of parentaye
is unimportant when a psychological parent-child relationship has been established.
In any event this Court cannot ignore its numerous
commitments to act in the best· interest of the child,

(see

State in the Interest of Mario A., supra at pg. 799), and
its recognition that the welfare of the child is paramount
to any custody rights in the natural parents. (In re State

in the Interest of Jennings, 432 P.2d 879, 1967; State in
the Interest

o~

Winger, 538 P.2d 1311 (1976)).

The great

weight of the evidence in the instant case preponderates
in favor of terminating the appellants parental rights

if our desire is to serve the best interest of the child.
At least one Court of which respondent is aware has even
sugqested that the right of a child to be cut from the
control of his biological parent when it is in his best
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rise:_;

to--~:.-=._

biologi,--:al parent'.:;,
(l_n_..2:..c:_~~y:,

lt_~':•:_·l

o:

d

cn11:::::_-it.:_1_1Lic1rt.,l

seer:1ingly woulJ be·

uncu·1stj(-11-L·~

N.Y. Fa:n. Ct., 1977, 393 N.Y.S.

2cl

51~).

The Juvenile Court correctly terminated appell 1r,t';
parental rights.

There was sufficient evidence in

zrc

record to support the Court's determination that a;:·Jella··
has abandoned her children and was unfit or

incompete~'.:

reason of conduct or condition seriously detrir.iental to
This Court should affirm the decision of the Ju·1e:_

them.
Court.

Respectfully submitted this 31st day of October,

r·

ROBERT B. HANSEN
General

~torney

~ d-~/!ir /)_ '177t~-2.-f-'-/
1

FRANKLJN B. MATHESON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

OLOF JOHANNSON
Deputy County Attorney
Salt Lake County
Attorneys for Respondent State:
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I certify two copies of the foregoing Brief of
R2spond~nt

StatP of Utah were mailed this

day of

Octob2r, 1977, to (1) Don Blackham Attorney for Appellant,
2525 South 3200 lve.c;t,

Salt Lake City, Utah, 84119,

(2)

David E. Littlefield, Esq., Guardian Ad Litem, Suite 707,
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (3) David S.
Dolowitz, Attorney for Foster Parents, Evan and Bart Orgill,
79 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84147.
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